Stephen L. Quackenbush
Office: 304 Professional Bldg.
Phone: 573-882-2082
Email: Quackenbushs@missouri.edu
Web: web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs
Stephen L. Quackenbush (Assistant Professor) has been with the Department since 2005. He received his Ph.D. in 2003 from the University at Buffalo, SUNY. His research focuses on international conflict.
Research Statement
My primary field of specialization is in international relations, with emphases in security and conflict processes, foreign policy, formal theory, and quantitative research methodology. My research focuses on two primary areas: deterrence and recurrent conflict.
In the area of deterrence, my research has focused on improving our understanding of the dynamics of deterrence through formal theory building, rigorous quantitative testing, and policy application. These efforts began in my dissertation, "General Deterrence and International Conflict: Bridging the Formal/Quantitative Divide," which I intend to develop into a book in the future. They have continued in a series of articles and works in progress. For example, in "Not only Whether but Whom: Three-party Extended Deterrence" (Journal of Conflict Resolution 2006), I develop a new model of extended deterrence that considers the strategic interactions of all three actors in extended deterrence, explicitly models the simultaneous conduct of extended and direct deterrence, and allows examination of other issues such as the target of a challenge and alliance reliability. In "General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory" (currently under review), I subject a newly developed theory of deterrence to an extensive empirical test using cases of general deterrence from 1816-2000. I find that perfect deterrence theory is strongly supported by the historical record and is therefore an appropriate basis for further empirical research, theoretical development, and policy application. In "National Missile Defense and Deterrence" (Political Research Quarterly 2006), I apply perfect deterrence theory to an analysis of national missile defense. I find that, contrary to traditional views, effective missile defense would enhance the stability of deterrence. Finally, in "Game Theory: Modeling Interstate Conflict" (Making Sense of International Relations Theory 2006), Frank Zagare and I analyze the war in Kosovo through the lens of deterrence theory and find that it is important to understand the credibility and capability of each side’s threats in order to explain the unfolding of the Kosovo war.
My research in deterrence has also led to analyses of other aspects of international relations. For example, to identify cases of general deterrence in the study discussed above, I argue that the most inclusive route to general deterrence case selection is identifying opportunity for conflict. This led me to analyze existing measures of opportunity and develop an improved one in "Identifying Opportunity for Conflict: Politically Active Dyads" (Conflict Management and Peace Science 2006). Deterrence theory also relies heavily on the assumption of instrumental rationality. Accordingly, it is important to properly understand the assumption of rationality and the role of assumptions in theory, which I attempt to do in "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory" (International Interactions 2004).
A second key avenue for my research is in improving our understanding of recurrent conflict between states. In "Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace" (Journal of Politics 2003), Paul Senese and I argue that imposed settlements are more stabilizing than negotiated settlements. Duration analyses of all dispute settlements from 1816-1992 strongly support our expectations. I am continuing research on recurrent conflict through three projects currently underway. In "Recurrent Conflict and International Rivalry" (presented at APSA 2006), Paul Senese and I account for the influence of international rivalries and find that imposed settlements not only remain stabilizing influences, but are the only factor whose effect does not vary with time. I am also examining the interaction between 1) dispute settlements and outcomes in "Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conflict" (invited to revise and resubmit at Journal of Peace Research) (with Jerome Venteicher, a graduate student at Missouri) and 2) territorial issues and dispute settlements in "Mapping the Steps to War: Territorial Issues and Recurrent Conflict" (to be presented at the MPSA 2007). Each of these studies increases our understanding of important factors affecting recurrent conflict between states while consistently finding support for our original argument regarding the stability of imposed settlements.
Courses Taught
Introduction to International Relations
Introduction to Political Research
Theories of International Relations
Politics and War
Quantitative Approaches to International Relations (Graduate)
International Conflict (Graduate)
Recent Representative Publications
Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2006. "National Missile Defense and Deterrence," Political Research Quarterly 59(4): 533-41.
Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2006. "Not only Whether but Whom: Three-party Extended Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4): 562-83.
Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2006. "Identifying Opportunity for Conflict: Politically Active Dyads." Conflict Management and Peace Science 23(1): 37-51.
Quackenbush, Stephen L., and Frank C. Zagare. 2006. "Game Theory: Modeling Interstate Conflict." In Making Sense of International Relations Theory, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2004. "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory." International Interactions 30(2): 87-107.
Senese, Paul D., and Stephen L. Quackenbush. 2003. "Sowing the Seeds of Conflict: The Effect of Dispute Settlements on Durations of Peace." Journal of Politics 65(3): 696-717.