

Political Science 9140 American Political Institutions

Instructor: Jennifer Selin

Overview

This course offers an introduction to the study of political institutions in the United States. During the course, we will examine theories of how political institutions function in the modern era. The purpose of the course is not to provide a summary of how various institutions work, nor to provide comprehensive coverage of research on those institutions. Instead, the goal is to examine the way in which scholars think about and study institutions – the difficulties and opportunities that the study of institutions presents.

The course has three aims. The first is to introduce students to the methodology used in the study of American political institutions. The second goal of the course is to expose students to key works on various aspects of American politics and to require students to think critically about public institutions. Finally, the course will highlight potential avenues for future research.

Books

The required texts are as follows and can be purchased new or used through online vendors such as Amazon or Barnes and Noble. To ensure that no student is disadvantaged, students should let me know if they have trouble acquiring the texts for any reason.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2005. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1998. *The Choices Justices Make*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lee, Frances and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 1999. *Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.

Course Requirements:

This course operates as a graduate seminar. Each student is expected to do the assigned reading before each seminar and to come to class prepared for discussion. Preparation involves (a) an

ability to synthesize the main arguments or findings from each reading and (b) an attempt to assess the validity of the work critically and constructively. Here are some questions students should ask themselves in preparation for class:

- What is the main topic of the article/book? Why does the author believe it is important?
- What is the question being asked and answered?
- How does this work relate to earlier work on the topic?
- What is the argument?
- What evidence does the author use to test the argument and what evidence, if it existed, would falsify the argument?
- What are some alternative explanations for the empirical findings?
- Does the argument pass the “sniff test” (i.e., does it seem to make sense?)

Discussion

Each seminar will consist of a structured discussion of the week’s assigned readings. I will provide the structure and the students will provide the discussion. Our aim is to evaluate scholarship on a subject and to see what lessons that scholarship offers for those engaged in political science research. *Each student is expected to participate actively in each week’s discussion.* Students should contact me immediately if, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, accommodations are necessary to enable class participation.

Short paper

While more information will be provided in the first weeks of the course, each student will write one short paper over the course of the semester. The paper will consist of an evaluation of the literature we have read on a particular institution: Congress, the executive branch, or the judiciary. The purpose of the paper is to develop students’ skills at research synthesis and to help professionalize students in the discipline.

These papers are *not* an opportunity to summarize the assigned readings nor are they the typical graduate seminar “reflection paper.” The papers should be well organized, well written, and no more than 10 double-spaced pages.

Final paper

While more information will be provided over the course of the semester, students are required to write a final research paper reviewing the literature related to a specific research question. The purpose of the paper is to help develop students’ skills at political analysis and to provide each student an opportunity to engage with a topic relating to political institutions. The key to a good paper is to pose an interesting question and answer it. Students may choose any research question relating to American institutions that is unresolved in the literature. In writing papers, I encourage students to adopt the following viewpoint, offered by a former colleague:

A paper that fails to develop an argument until the last paragraph is called a rough draft. A paper that fails to anticipate potential counterarguments or is filled with

grammatical, spelling, or typing errors is called a second draft. A paper that you would be proud to read to the class is called a final draft. I value final drafts.

I expect students to work on these papers throughout the semester and there will be three assignments designed to help students incrementally develop their papers:

- *Paper Topic Proposal*
 - Each student must select a research question and submit a one-page proposal on the topic. This proposal should contain a paragraph or two outlining the proposed research question.
- *Literature Review Outline*
 - Each student must submit an outline organizing the scholarship relevant to her research question. The outline is expected to be fairly comprehensive and organized in a way that helps the student develop a theory. While there is no “correct” way to create an outline, here are some guidelines:
 - At the beginning of the outline, the student should state clearly and concisely the research question.
 - The outline should provide a blueprint for the student’s final research paper. This means that the outline should not only identify common themes across scholarship related to the student’s research question, but should also begin to identify implicit assumptions made in the literature.
 - The outline should be comprehensive enough to identify gaps in the literature and to clearly explain the need for further research in the area.
 - The average political scientist studying American political institutions relies on at least 40 to 60 different pieces of scholarship when developing a unique argument. Thus, the outline should contain a minimum of 30 academic references.
- *First Draft*
 - Each student must submit a fully developed first draft. This assignment is an opportunity for each student to get feedback regarding both the structure of the project and its content. To be clear, a good first draft will do the following:
 - Explain the importance of topic of the paper, specifically state the research question addressed, and provide a succinct summary of the author’s analysis of the literature.
 - Provide a review of literature that synthesizes previous research in thoughtful and creative ways. This review should also identify gaps and unanswered questions in the literature.
 - Identify the need for and importance of new research in the area related to the research question.

The final paper should be typed, double-spaced, and a *maximum* of 15 pages.

Assessment

Student assessment will be as follows:

Seminar participation: 15%

Short paper: 20%

Paper: 65%

 Paper Topic Proposal: 5%

 Literature Review Outline: 15%

 First Draft: 15%

 Final Draft: 30%

Students should plan ahead so that they will be able to meet class requirements and assignments. I will grant extensions only for officially documented illnesses, family emergencies, and similar personal circumstances. Please note that assignments or exams in other classes are not grounds for an extension in this class. While I do accept unexcused late assignments, I assess a penalty of *one third of a letter grade for each day of lateness*. The penalty is in fairness to all students who submit their assignments on time.

Cheating and Plagiarism

University standards for academic integrity apply in this class. Put simply, I do not tolerate cheating or plagiarism of any kind. Students are expected to know and understand the university's policies on this matter.

Disability Resources and Educational Services

To ensure that student concerns are properly addressed from the first day of class, I ask that students who require assistance to participate in this course contact me as soon as possible. To obtain academic adjustments and/or auxiliary aids, students who require accommodations should both contact me and the Disability Center as soon as possible. To contact the Disability Center, you may call 573-882-4696, email disabilitycenter@missouri.edu, or visit the Center's website: <http://disabilitycenter.missouri.edu>.

Decreasing the Risk of COVID-19

To provide safe, high-quality education during the COVID-19 pandemic, we will follow campus policies as follows:

- If you are experiencing any COVID-19 related symptoms, or are otherwise feeling unwell, do not attend class in person and contact your health care provider immediately. These symptoms include fever greater than 100.4 or chills; cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing; fatigue; unexplained muscle or body aches; headache; new loss of taste or smell; sore throat; congestion or runny nose; nausea or vomiting; diarrhea.
 - I will record the course for the sole purpose of sharing the recording with students who cannot attend class in person or virtually.
- Unless one has a documented exemption, all class participants will wear face coverings while in the classroom.
- We will maintain a six-foot distance from each other at all times.
- In order to maintain personal distancing, I will give the signal for students to exit in an orderly and paced manner.

Compliance with these guidelines is required and anyone who fails to comply will be subject to the accountability process as stated in the University's Collected Rules and Regulations.

Class Schedule

The schedule for the course is provided below. Readings not listed above as the required texts are posted on Canvas. Students are responsible for all readings listed prior to the class period in which they are discussed.

How Do We Study American Political Institutions?

- Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. 1963. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework." *American Political Science Review* 57(3):632-642.
- Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44(5):936-957.
- Moe, Terry M. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(4):739-777.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64(4):1033-1053.

Recommended:

- Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz Harold. 1972. "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization." *The American Economic Review* 62(5):777-795.
- Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17(1):1-25.
- Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1992. *Economics, Organization and Management*. Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Quattrone, George A. and Amos Tversky. 1988. "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analysis of Political Choice." *American Political Science Review* 82(3):719-736.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. *Analyzing Politics*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company.

Who Runs for Congress?

- Fox, Richard L. and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2005. "To Run or Not to Run: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3):659-676.
- Johnson, Gbemende, Bruce I. Oppenheimer, and Jennifer L. Selin. 2012. "The House as a Stepping Stone to the Senate: Why Do So Few African American House Members Run?" *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2):387-399.
- Rohde, David W. 1979. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(1):1-26.
- Stone, Walter J. and L. Sandy Maisel. 2003. "The Not-So-Simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S. House Candidates' Nomination and General Election Chances." *Journal of Politics* 65(4):951-977.

Recommended:

- Black, Gordon S. 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." *American Political Science Review* 66(1):144-159.
- Canon, David T. 1990. *Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Junke, Eric Gonzalez. 2014. "Ignorance is Bias: The Effect of Latino Losers on Models of Latino Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3):593-603.
- Kanthak, Kristin and Jonathan Woon. 2015. "Women Don't Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3):595-612.
- Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox. 2004. *It Takes a Candidates: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lawless, Jennifer L. and Kathryn Pearson. 2008. "The Primary Reason for Women's Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom." *Journal of Politics* 70(1):67-82.
- Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1966. *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

How Do Members of Congress Represent their Constituents?

- Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review* 90(4):794-812.
- Dove, Suzanne. 2002. "Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?" *American Political Science Review* 96(4):729-743.
- Lee, Frances and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 1999. *Sizing up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Recommended:

- Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 22(3):511-535.
- Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York, NY: Longman.
- Glazer, Amihai and Marc Robbins. 1985. "Congressional Responsiveness to Constituency Change." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2):259-273.
- Grimmer, Justin. 2013. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Grose, Christian. 2011. *Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation.'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1):183-186.

Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57(1):45-56.

What Happens in Congress?

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Dino P. Christenson, and Alison W. Craig. 2019. "Cue-Taking in Congress: Interest Group Signals from Dear Colleague Letters." *American Journal of Political Science* 63(1):163-180

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Recommended:

Clausen, Aage R. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Fiorina. 1977. *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kingdon, John W. 1973. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Wright, John R. 1985. "PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 79(2):400-414.

Paper Topic Proposal Due

What Explains Lawmaking?

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Recommended:

Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 83(4):1181-1206.

Chiou, Fang-Yi and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2003. "When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3):503-522.

Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98(2):355-370.

Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Sinclair, Barbara. 2016. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*, 6th Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Where's the Party?

Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rhode. 1998. "Measuring Conditional Party Government." Paper prepared for the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Recommended:

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2):235-266.

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. "The New American Political Party." *American Political Science Review* 79(4):1152-1169.

Smith, Steven S. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

How is Congress Organized?

Curry, James M. 2019. "Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 44(2):203-237.

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62(1):144-168.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *American Political Science Review* 81(1):85-104.

Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1):132-163.

Recommended:

Adler, E. Scott and John Lapinski. 1997. "Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3):895-918.

Binder, Sarah A. 1996. "The Partisan Bias of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990." *American Political Science Review* 90:8-20.

Crombez, Chrisophe, Tim Groseclose, and Keith Krehbiel. 2006. "Gatekeeping." *Journal of Politics* 68(2):322-334.

Finocchiaro, Charles J. and David W. Rohde. 2008. "War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33(1):35-61.

- Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias." *American Political Science Review* 84(4):1149-1166.
- Schickler, Eric. 2001. *Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Are Presidents Powerful?

- Moe, Terry M. and William Howell. 1999. "The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15(1):132-179.
- Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
- Selections from Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (pg 17-58).
- Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. "The Two Presidencies." *Society* 35(2):23-31.

Recommended:

- Bolton, Alexander and Sharece Thrower. 2016. "Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism" *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3):649-663.
- Bond, Jon R. and Richard Fleisher. 1990. *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, William Howell, and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis." *Journal of Politics* 70(1):1-16.
- Edwards, George C. 1989. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Howell, William G. 2003. *Power Without Persuasion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political Science Review* 99(1):107-123.
- Lewis, David E. and James Michael Strine. 1996. "What Time Is It? The Use of Power in Four Different Types of Presidential Time." *Journal of Politics* 58(3):682-706.
- Lowi, Theodore J. 1985. *The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Newman, Brian and Kevin Lammert. 2011. "Polls and Elections: Divided Government and Foreign Relations Approval." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 41(2):375-392.
- Peterson, Mark A. 1993. *Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rudalevige, Andrew. 2005. *The New Imperial Presidency? Presidential Power in the World After Watergate*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Literature Review Outline Due

How Do Presidents Interact with the Public?

- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2005. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Selections from Kernell, Samuel. 2007. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, 4th Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press (pg 1-47).
- Rivers, Douglas and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. "Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2):183-196.

Recommended:

- Baum, Matthew and Samuel Kernell. 1999. "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *American Political Science Review* 93(1):99-114.
- Brody, Richard A. 1991. *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Geer, John G. 1996. *From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Meyer-Gutbrod, Joshua. 2020. "New Conflicts in the Briefing Room: Using Sentiment Analysis to Evaluate Administration-press Relations from Clinton through Trump." *Political Communication*. Early View.
- Tulis, Jeffrey. 1987. *The Rhetorical Presidency*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

What Does it Mean to be CEO of the Executive Branch?

- Selections from Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (pg 51-79; 103-140).
- Moe, Terry M. 1985. "The Politicized Presidency." In, J.E. Chubb and P.E. Peterson, eds., *The New Direction in American Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Selections from Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. *Managing the Presidents Program: Centralization and Legislative Policy Formulation, 1949-1996*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University (pg 1-40; 86-112).

Recommended:

- Dickinson, Matthew J. 1996. *Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power and the Growth of the Presidential Branch*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Heclo, Hugh. 1977. *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Krause, George A. 1999. *A Two Way Street: The Institutional Dynamics of the Modern Administrative State*. Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Krutz, Glen S., Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond. 1998. "From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate." *American Political Science Review* 92(4):871-881.

- Light, Paul. 1995. *Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diffusion of Accountability*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- McCarty, Nolan. 2004. "The Appointments Dilemma." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3):413-428.
- McCarty, Nolan and Rose Razaghian. 1999. "Advice and Consent: Senate Response to Executive Branch Nominations, 1885-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4):1122-1143.
- Nixon, David C. 2004. "Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 20(2):438-457.
- Pfiffner, James P. 1996. *The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running*, 2nd Rev. Ed., Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Ragsdale, Lyn and John J. Thesis III. 1997. "The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-1992." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4):1280-1318.

How is the Executive Branch Organized?

- Anderson, Sarah E. and Matthew Potoski. 2016. "Agency Structure and the Distribution of Federal Spending." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 26(3):461-474.
- Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In, J.E. Chubb and P.E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Selin, Jennifer L. and David E. Lewis. 2018. *Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies*, 2nd Ed. Washington, DC: Administrative Conference of the United States.

Recommended:

- Horn, Murray J. 1995. *The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Howell, William G. and David E. Lewis. 2002. "Agencies by Presidential Design." *Journal of Politics* 64(4):1095-1114.
- Lewis, David E. 2002. "The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality." *Journal of Politics* 64(1):89-107.
- Lewis, David E. 2003. *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- MacDonald, Jason A. 2007. "Agency Design and Postlegislative Influence over the Bureaucracy." *Political Research Quarterly* 60(4):683-695.
- Moe, Ronald C. 1980. *The Federal Executive Establishment: Evolution and Trends*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service
- Moe, Terry M. and Scott A. Wilson. 1994. "Presidents and the Politics of Structure." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 57(2):1-44.
- Selin, Jennifer L. 2015. "What Makes an Agency Independent?" *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4):971-987.
- Ting, Michael M. 2003. "A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 274-292.
- Wood, B. Dan and John Bohte. 2004. "Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design." *Journal of Politics* 66(1):176-202.

Zegart, Amy B. 1999. *Flawed By Design*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

How Does the Executive Branch Get Policymaking Authority?

Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Selections from Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press (pg 37-47).

Recommended:

Bendor, Jonathan, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas H. Hammond. 2001. "Theories of Delegation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:235-269.

Bendor, Jonathan and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation." *American Political Science Review* 98(2):293-310.

Huber, John D. and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion?* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2):330-345.

Lowande, Kenneth. 2018. "Delegation or Unilateral Action?" *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 34(1):54-78.

Volden, Craig. 2002. "A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1):111-133.

Wiseman, Alan E. 2009. "Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies." *The Journal of Politics* 71(3):998-1014.

First Draft Due

What Explains Supreme Court Decision-making?

Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1998. *The Choices Justices Make*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Selections from Segal, Jeffrey and Harold Spaeth. 2002. *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited*. New York, NY: Cambridge (pg 44-114).

Recommended:

Bailey, Michael A. and Forrest Maltzman. 2008. "Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* (102):369-384.

Boucher, Robert L. and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1995. "Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers." *Journal of Politics* (57):824-837.

Carrubba, Cliff, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, and Georg Vanberg. 2011. "Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?" *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2):400-412.

- George, Tracy E. and Lee Epstein. 1992. "On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision-Making." *American Political Science Review* 86(2):323-337.
- Hansford, Thomas G. and James F. Spriggs II. 2006. *The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rice, Douglas R. 2017. "Issue Divisions and US Supreme Court Decision Making." *Journal of Politics* 79(1):210-222.

How Does the Supreme Court Decide Which Cases to Hear?

- Baird, Vanessa A. 2004. "The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court's Agenda." *Journal of Politics* 66(3):755-772.
- Black, Ryan C. and Ryan J. Owens. 2009. "Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence." *Journal of Politics* (71):1062-1075.
- Harvey, Anna and Barry Friedman. 2009. "Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court's Agenda." *Journal of Politics* 71(2):574-592.
- Yates, Jeff, Andrew B. Whitford, and William Gillespie. 2005. "Agenda Setting, Issue Priorities, and Organizational Maintenance: The US Supreme Court, 1955-1994." *British Journal of Political Science* 35(2):369-381.

Recommended:

- Caldeira, Gregory A. and John R. Wright. 1988. "Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 82(4):1109-1127.
- McGuire, Kevin T. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1993. "Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* (87):715-726.p
- Owens, Ryan J. 2010. "The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2):412-427.
- Perry, H.W. 1991. *Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Strayhorn, Joshua A. 2020. "Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy." *American Journal of Political Science* 64(2):371-384.

How Do Political Actors Exert Influence on the Judiciary?

- Kastellac, Jonathan. 2012. "Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1):167-183.
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